



INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH

—POLITIC5001—

Spring term 2017

Lecture: Wednesdays, 12 noon - 1pm, St Andrews Building 237A/B

Seminar 1: Wednesdays, 1pm-2pm, St Andrews Building 218

Seminar 2: Wednesdays, 3pm-4pm, Sir Charles Wilson Building 101A/B

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Character of the course

This course introduces key arguments, research designs, and methodologies for studying and understanding cutting-edge research in International Relations. In particular, it investigates the roles of state and non-state actors in shaping international politics and examines the motivations for actor behavior. The course explores these issues by analysing a number of examples and seeks to train students in how to apply their knowledge to current political challenges in international politics.

Format of teaching

The class is taught in ten sessions, which are intended to bring together elements of lecturing and student participation. Each class will start with a one hour lecture (for all students), followed by two one-hour seminars. Students only need to participate in **one** of these seminars. Seminars will open with **short** collaborative student presentations to introduce each week's readings and relate them to a recent newspaper article of their choice, followed by discussion and student group work. Every student is expected to have completed **all required readings prior to class** and be adequately prepared to contribute to discussions. As this class is research-intensive, detailed knowledge of the assigned readings is a necessity and helps ensure that this class is rewarding for everyone.

Course content and dates

This course focuses on providing students with analytical tools to understand current developments in research in International Relations. Specifically, the course aims to provide a deep understanding of more advanced theories and concepts from the International Relations literature.

The course consists of three parts. The first part (weeks 1/2) introduces students to both qualitative and quantitative research designs. The second part (weeks 3-5 & 9), taught by Dr Florea, analyses how modern sovereignty norms emerged and were institutionalized, how the nation-state became the dominant unit in international politics, how rebel actors claim and exercise authority in a system dominated by sovereign countries, and how criminal activities undertaken by non-state actors help explain internal conflict. The third part (weeks 7/8 & 10/11), taught by Dr Bayer, studies multilateral treaties and international organizations as well as the role of domestic politics and democratic institutions in IR research. There is no class in week 6, which is the reading week.

The summary of the course topics with class dates is as follows:

- Week 1: 11 January — Qualitative research designs (Dr Florea)
- Week 2: 18 January — Quantitative research designs (Dr Bayer)
- Week 3: 25 January — Sovereignty (Dr Florea)
- Week 4: 1 February — War and state making (Dr Florea)
- Week 5: 8 February — Rebel group behavior (Dr Florea)

Week 6: 15 February — Reading week (no class)

Week 7: 22 February — International institutions: Fundamentals and design (Dr Bayer)

Week 8: 1 March — International institutions: Compliance, enforcement, & effectiveness (Dr Bayer)

Week 9: 8 March — Crime and civil war (Dr Florea)

Week 10: 15 March — Domestic politics in IR and audience costs (Dr Bayer)

Week 11: 22 March — Democratic institutions: Trade and the global environment (Dr Bayer)

Aims

- To critically examine and apply different approaches to understanding international politics and policy in IR research.
- To identify and assess the behavior of state and non-state actors in international politics.
- To explore the nature and causes of contemporary challenges that are beyond the capacity of individual states to address.
- To consider appropriate international responses to dealing with these challenges and explore the opportunities and obstacles for effective multilateral cooperation.

Intended learning outcomes

By the end of the course, through essays, seminar preparation, and presentations, students should be able to:

- demonstrate a command of key concepts for understanding international politics and cutting-edge research in international relations;
- analyse the nature of and evaluate the significance of state and non-state actors in international relations;
- explore and assess the range, nature, extent, and causes of contemporary challenges in international politics, including the reasons for their complexity;
- construct their own understanding, both theoretically and in terms of research design, of the most appropriate policy responses to dealing with these challenges and explore associated trade-offs.

In addition, through seminar presentations and discussions and through essay writing, students should also acquire the following transferable skills:

- the ability to access and make effective use of bibliographical and electronic sources of knowledge and information;
- the ability to analyse written texts and prepare, articulate, and defend reasoned answers to set questions;
- written communication skills, conveying information and ideas fluently to form sustained arguments;

- presentation skills, conveying information and ideas succinctly and effectively by using visual support and handouts and by keeping within prescribed time-limits;
- working collaboratively with others to reach and sustain convincing lines of argument;
- self-motivation and time-management in order to meet specified deadlines;
- experience of how to use empirical data to evaluate theoretical claims.

Assessment

Assessment comprises formative (non-assessed) and summative (assessed) assessments.

a. Formative assessment: Group presentation

The formative assessment comes in the form of a short, 10-minute group presentation. Each week, students will be tasked with offering a short summary of the three core readings, focusing on the papers' arguments. The summary should be **analytical** and not simply a description of the readings. In addition, each student group is to identify a newspaper article that is directly relevant to the course readings, which illustrates how the academic arguments surface in current, public debates in international politics. As part of this exercise, each student group will also produce a **written, one-page summary** that will be uploaded to Moodle and should offer fellow students a good point of reference for the course readings.

Presentations can be casual, and there is no need for any form of visual support. The assessments will not be graded, but we are happy to provide you with feedback about your performance. Students will be randomly assigned to groups and topics, and group presentations will start in week 3.

b. Summative assessment: Essay

The summative assessment is a single essay (5,000 words), which comprises the following three parts:

- Part I: Research design question (1,000 words, 20% of final grade)
- Part II: Short answer question on “conflict” topic (2,000 words, 40% of final grade)
- Part III: Short answer question on “institutions” topic (2,000 words, 40% of final grade)

The essay deadline is **Tuesday, 18 April 2017** at 4pm. Word limits for each part are strict word limits, and penalties apply once you go more than 10% over the allowed word count. Please consult the MSc/MRes in International Relations and the SPS PG Student Handbooks for details on **submission of assessed work, Urkund, marking conventions, penalties, extensions** and other matters. Exchange or disability students should contact the lecturers to make special arrangements. Please contact us immediately if you have any questions or concerns!

Good essays should show consistency of argumentation together with acknowledgement of rival arguments, clear structure, simple and direct writing, good punctuation and evidence of wide reading. For Part I of the assessment choose **one of the two questions on research design**, for Part II

choose **one out of four questions on “conflict” topics** (i.e., weeks taught by Dr Florea), and for Part III choose **one out of four questions on “institutions” topics** (i.e., weeks taught by Dr Bayer). As the individual parts are independent from each other, we suggest you start working on your answers already during the course to avoid “end of term congestion.”

Essay questions

a. Part I: Research design (choose one!)

- (1) The “Democratic Peace Theory” argues that democracies interact more peacefully than their autocratic counterparts. Describe and defend a research design that would allow you to rigorously test this claim!
- (2) Some scholars posit that countries with discriminated minorities are more susceptible to experiencing civil wars. Think of a qualitative or quantitative research design that allows you to test this hypothesis.

b. Part II: Conflict topics (choose one!)

- (3) How does the organizational structure of rebel groups influence civil conflict outcomes, such as duration or termination? Discuss with reference to one or two ongoing insurgencies.
- (4) Besides fighting against government forces or against other insurgents, many rebel groups engage in governance activities, such as taxation or public goods provision (e.g. local administration; healthcare; schooling). Why do some rebels undertake the onerous task of governing the territory they control while others don't? Discuss with reference to one or two ongoing or past insurgencies.
- (5) On the European continent, warfare has historically been a key driver behind state consolidation. Is this process visible in other regions as well? Why (not)?
- (6) What are the key mechanisms through which criminal activities undertaken by insurgents affect civil conflict processes, such as duration, severity, or termination? Discuss with reference to at least two insurgencies.

c. Part III: Institutions topics (choose one!)

- (7) Why and how does treaty design matter for international cooperation. Discuss this statement and illustrate your answer with examples.
- (8) International organizations cannot be effective as they typically lack enforcement power. Discuss why this is (or is not) a legitimate claim.
- (9) In what ways do audience costs matter for explaining international politics outcomes, both theoretically and empirically?
- (10) Democracies are more supportive of free trade than autocracies. Carefully discuss why and under which conditions this statement is true.

Essay submission

You must respect the following guidelines when you submit an assessed essay:

- Submit **two hard copies** to the postgraduate administrator, Ms Clair Clarke;
- Complete an essay cover sheet for each hard copy of the essay; do not put your name on your essay or cover sheet, just your matriculation number.
- Essays should be typed or word-processed, double-spaced in 12pt type and should have a one-and-a-half inch margin (3.81 cm).
- **Word limits** for all assessed work include footnotes and bibliography. Students should clearly state the word count on the cover sheet of their assessed work. Students who exceed the word limit will be penalised: 1 point for exceeding the word limit by 10-15%, 2 points for 15-20%, 3 points for 20-25%, and so on.
- For all Politics PG courses, you are required to upload an electronic version of your essay to Urkund before handing in the two hard copies.

Detailed guidance about Urkund, how to upload your work and how to interpret your originality reports, as well as for **penalties for late submission**, can be found in the MSc/MRes in International Relations and SPS PG Student Handbooks and on the following website: <https://goo.gl/yVDhaj>

Guide to essay marking

Grade	Mark	Description
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5	22 21 20 19 18	<p>Excellent performance is characterised by most but necessarily all of the following:</p> <p>Clear, comprehensive answer that displays sound critical thinking and insights</p> <p>Relevant evidence and readings from the course, and perhaps beyond, are cited accurately with very few errors.</p> <p>All key points are addressed fully</p> <p>Originality, creativity, and independent judgement are present</p>
B1 B2 B3	17 16 15	<p>Very good performance is characterised by most but not necessarily all of the following:</p> <p>Clear answer that fully addresses the key points</p> <p>Sound reasoning that displays a good understanding of the subject matter</p> <p>Relevant evidence and course readings are used with few errors</p> <p>Less critical thinking, originality, and insight than in an excellent performance</p>
C1 C2 C3	14 13 12	<p>Good performance is characterised by most but not necessarily all of the following:</p> <p>Answer displays a basic understanding of the subject matter</p> <p>Evidence of reading from course materials, but some points may not be fully relevant</p> <p>Little in the way of an argument or critical thinking</p> <p>Some errors may be present</p>
D1 D2 D3	11 10 9	<p>Satisfactory performance is characterised by most but not necessarily all of the following:</p> <p>Only a modest understanding of the subject matter is displayed</p> <p>Modest evidence of reading from course materials, with the inclusion of a few relevant points</p> <p>Many errors may be present</p>
E1 E2 E3	8 7 6	<p>Weak performance is characterised by most but not necessarily all of the following:</p> <p>Failure to answer question, though there may be an answer to a similar question</p> <p>Little evidence of any understanding of the subject matter is displayed</p> <p>Significant errors may be present</p>
F1 F2 F3	5 4 3	<p>Poor performance is characterised by most but not necessarily all of the following:</p> <p>Failure to answer question directly</p> <p>Very little evidence of any understanding of the subject matter is displayed</p> <p>Many significant errors are likely to be present</p>
G1 G2	2 1	<p>Very poor performance is characterised by most of the following:</p> <p>Failure to answer question</p> <p>No evidence of any understanding of the subject matter is displayed</p>
H	0	Absence of positive qualities

Plagiarism

Plagiarism constitutes academic fraud and will not be tolerated. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's work as your own. The University Calendar says that it is "considered as an act of academic fraudulence and is an offence against University discipline." The University Calendar sets out the procedure that a Head of Department must follow if plagiarism of assessed work is suspected. The presentation of someone else's essay is obviously fraudulent, but the dividing line between your own work and that of your sources is less clear. The solution is always to acknowledge your sources and to use quotations when repeating exactly what someone else has said. Generally you should avoid excessive paraphrasing of others' writings, even with acknowledgement; it does not demonstrate that you have understood the material you are reproducing. If in doubt seek guidance from your teachers. For more information about plagiarism, please refer to the MSc/MRes in International Relations and SPS PG Student Handbooks as well as the following website: <http://www.gla.ac.uk/plagiarism/>.

Course requirements

- Regular attendance to seminars: A record of your attendance will be kept.
- Completion of all required readings. Identifying and sharing additional material relevant to the class (e.g. news items) is strongly encouraged.
- Participation in class discussions and completion of assigned tasks in-between weeks, as requested by the lecturers.
- Group presentations as a summary of three core readings plus a news article, including a one-page handout.
- Submission of a single, written 5,000-word long essay.

Readings and how to use the reading list

The weekly readings for this class are listed below. You are expected to read all of the **required readings in advance of every seminar**, so that you can contribute to the discussions. Seminar readings are taken from widely-cited journal articles or books. Electronic versions of all required readings as PDFs are available for download from Moodle. For your coursework, you will need to draw on the recommended readings which can be accessed through the Library webpage.

The majority of journal articles are available online, even if a hyperlink is not included. The easiest way to find them is to google the title and follow the link to the journal's webpage. To gain access to the full text, **you will need to be on campus or to log in with your GUID password** (if you don't know it, ask at the Library). In some cases, you may need to access the articles via the Library page. If you are off campus, you might need VPN access.

Note: The digital course pack uploaded on Moodle has been compiled to facilitate access to most of the mandatory readings. However, because of copyright issues, generally we can only provide one

chapter per book. If more than one chapter is listed in the reading list, it is your responsibility to borrow the book from the library for further reading. All key books will be on short loan.

Students should use Moodle for access to seminar notes and other additional resources, including unpublished readings. Please note that copyright of these pieces, unless otherwise stated, remains with the author/s of the piece.

Don't limit yourselves to the reading list. If you have difficulty getting hold of any of the items listed, you are expected to use your initiative and look for other appropriate material or to contact the lecturers. You are also encouraged to make use of the internet and newspapers to gain relevant information and keep up with current affairs.

Finally, there are several security and international relations journals available in the library. You are strongly advised to look for relevant articles in them. Particularly useful journals include: *American Journal of Political Science*, *American Political Science Review*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *International Organization*, *International Security*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Journal of Politics*, *Review of International Organizations*, *Security Studies*, *World Politics*.

We strongly encourage you to read the required readings in the **order listed below**. The first reading is always a theoretical (overview) piece, while the second and third readings offer an in-depth discussion, case studies, or elaboration of the arguments/concepts introduced in the first paper. The final reading is always a current application or an illustration of how the academic arguments are useful for our understanding of current debates and policy discussions. Readings indicated with '[*]' are the ones you should read after you have done the required readings.

Week 1 (9/1): *Qualitative research designs*

Module 1 offers an introduction to the course, and discusses the core elements of qualitative research designs.

Required readings:

- Chenoweth, E., and M.J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press. Chapter 1.
- George, A.L., and A. Bennett. 2004. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapter 4.
- Gerring, J. 2010. Causal Mechanisms: Yes, But... *Comparative Political Studies* 43: 1499-1526.
- Mahoney, J., and G. Goertz. 2006. A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research. *Political Analysis* 14: 227-249.

Recommended readings:

- Brady, H.E. 2008. Causation and Explanation in Social Science. In the *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 217-270.
- [*] Falletti, T.G., and Lynch, G.F. 2009. Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies* 42: 1143-1166.
- Kellstedt, P.M., and G.D. Whiten. 2009. *The Fundamentals of Political Science Research*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- [*] Levy, J.S. 2008. Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25: 1-18.
- Van Evera, S. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Week 2 (16/1): *Quantitative research designs*

This module introduces and discusses quantitative research designs. We will focus specifically on the conceptual foundation of statistical inference as well as problems of identification, measurement, and selection.

Required readings:

- Gschwend, T., and F. Schimmelfennig. 2007. Introduction: Designing Research in Political Science – A Dialogue between Theory and Data. In: Gschwend, T., and F. Schimmelfennig. 2007. *Research Design in Political Science: How to Practice What They Preach*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fearon, J. 1991. Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. *World Politics* 43(2): 169-195.
- King, G., R.O. Keohane, and S. Verba, S. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. Chapter 4: 115-149. [Available as ebook here: <https://goo.gl/4BqrC2>]
- Keohane, R.O. 2009. Political Science as a Vocation. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 42(2): 359-363.

Recommended readings:

- [*] Brady, H.E., and D. Collier (eds). 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (2nd edition)*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. [NB: Read King, Keohane, and Verba first]
- King, G. 1995. Replication, Replication. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28(3): 444-452.
- [*] King, G., R.O. Keohane, and S. Verba, S. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.

- —. 1995. The Importance of Research Design in Political Science. *American Political Science Review*. 89(2): 475-481.
- King, G., and L. Zeng. 2007. When Can History Be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference. *International Studies Quarterly* 51(1): 183-210.
- [*] Lieberman, E.S. 2005. Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 435-452.
- Schrodtt, P.A. 2007. Of Dinosaurs and Barbecue Sauce: A Comment on King and Zeng. *International Studies Quarterly* 51(1): 211-215. [NB: Read after King and Zeng 2007.]
- Sekhon. J.S., and R. 2012. When Natural Experiments are Neither Natural nor Experiments. *American Political Science Review* 106(1):.35-57.

Week 3 (25/1): Sovereignty

Module 3 explores how sovereignty norms were established, how they became institutionalized in the post-World War II environment, and how they are challenged by contemporary state and non-state actor practices.

Required readings:

- Krasner, S.D. 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1.
- Branch, J. 2011. Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change. *International Organization* 65(1): 1-36.
- Clunan, A.L. and H.A. Trinkunas, eds. 2010. *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Chapter 1.
- Lewis-Kraus, G.. 2015. Welcome to Liberland, the World's Newest Country (Maybe). The New York Times Magazine. Available online: <https://goo.gl/3HQyZe>
- Jenkins, J. 2016. The Man Who Created a Tiny Country He Can No Longer Enter. BBC News Magazine. Available online: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-37941931>

Recommended readings:

- Agnew, J. 2005. Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers* 95: 437-461.
- Barkin, S. and B. Cronin. 1994. The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations. *International Organization* 48: 107-130.
- Bartleson, J. 2001. *The Critique of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Caporaso, J.A. 2000. Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty. *International Studies Review* 2: 1-28.

- Jackson, R.H. 1990. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kratochwil, F. 1986. Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System. *World Politics* 39(1): 27-52.
- [*] Lake, D. 2003. The New Sovereignty in International Relations. *International Studies Review* 5: 303-323.
- [*] Spruyt, H. 2002. The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 127-149.
- Spruyt, H. 1994. *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Week 4 (1/2): War and state making

This module investigates the mechanisms through which warfare is related to the birth and consolidation of modern states. The module also discusses how contemporary insurgencies engage in statelike practices.

Required readings:

- Tilly, C. 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Chapter 1.
- Centeno, M.A. 2002. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. Chapter 1.
- Rasler, K. and W. R. Thompson. 2012. War Making and State Making: How and Where Does It Fit into the Bigger Picture? In *What Do We Know About War?* 2nd edition, pages 237-255. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Barrett, R.. 2014. *The Islamic State*. New York: The Souffan Group.

Recommended readings:

- Atzili, B. 2012. *Good Fences, Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carter, D.B., and H.E. Goemans. 2011. The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the Emergence of Interstate Conflict. *International Organization* 65(2): 275-309.
- [*] Desch, M.C. 1996. War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States? *International Organization* 50(2): 237-268.
- Koubi, V. 2005. War and Economic Performance. *Journal of Peace Research* 42(1): 67-82.
- [*] Levy, S.J., and W.R. Thompson. 2011. *The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation, and Transformation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rasler, K., and W.R. Thompson. 1994. *The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Schwarz, R. 2013. *War and State Building in the Middle East*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.

- Taylor, B.D., and R. Botea. 2008. Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World. *International Studies Review* 10: 27-56.
- Thies, C. 2005. War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 451-465.
- —. 2007. The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Politics* 69(3): 716-731.
- Wimmer, A. 2013. *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Week 5 (8/2): Rebel group behavior

This module investigates important questions about the behavior of armed rebel groups: why they enter alliances with other insurgent organizations, when they are more likely to fragment, why some are more resilient than others, and why some engage in governance activities.

Required readings:

- Pearlman, W., and K.G. Cunningham. 2012. Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(1): 3-15.
- Christia, F. 2012. *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2.
- Arjona, A. 2011. *Armed Groups' Governance in Civil War: A Synthesis*. New York: CUNY, Program on States and Security.
- Vlassenroot, K. et al. 2016. *Contesting Authority: Armed Rebellion and Military Fragmentation in Walikale and Kalebe, North and South Kivu*. London: Rift Valley Institute.

Recommended readings:

- Bapat, N., and K.D. Bond. 2012. Alliances between Militant Groups. *British Journal of Political Science* 42(2): 793-824.
- [*] Blattman, C., and E. Miguel. 2010. Civil War. *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(1): 3-57.
- Hazen, J.M. 2013. *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- [*] Kalyvas, S.N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fjelde, H., and D. Nilsson. 2012. Rebels Against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(4): 604-628.
- Marten, K. 2012. *Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Salehyan, I. 2009. *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Sinno, A. 2008. *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Staniland, P. 2012. States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders. *Perspectives on Politics* 10(2): 243-264.
- Staniland, P. 2012. Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia. *International Security* 37: 142-177.
- Weinstein, J.M. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Week 6 (15/2): *Reading week*

Week 7 (22/2): *International institutions: Fundamentals and design*

This module focuses on the fundamental problem of international cooperation, why international institutions (e.g., treaties or IOs) are created, and how institutional design matters for problem solving.

Required readings:

- Martin, L.L., and Simmons, B.A. 1998. Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. *International Organization* 52(4): 729-757.
- Fortna, V.P. 2003. Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace. *International Organization* 57(2): 337-372.
- Koremenos, B. 2005. Contracting Around International Uncertainty. *International Organization* 99(4): 549-565.
- Linos, K. and Pegram, T. "Strong words Make Treaties More Effective. So Is the Paris Climate Accord Worded Too Flexibly?" 29 September 2016. *Washington Post, Monkeycage Blog*. Link: goo.gl/w7vCKA

Recommended readings:

- [*] Abbott, K. W., and D. Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3-32.
- [*] Axelrod, R., and R. O. Keohane. 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *World Politics* 38(1): 226-254.
- Barnett, M. N., and M. Finnemore. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization* 53(4): 699-732.

- Bayer, P., C. Marcoux, and J. Urpelainen. 2015. When International Organizations Bargain Evidence from the Global Environment Facility. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(6): 1074-1100.
- [*] Koremenos, B., C. Lipson, and D. Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55(4): 761-99.
- Lipsky, P. Y. 2015. Explaining Institutional Change: Policy Areas, Outside Options, and the Bretton Woods Institutions. *American Journal of Political Science* 59(2): 341-56.
- [*] Milner, H.V. 1992. International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses. *World Politics* 44(3): 466-496.
- Rosendorff, B. P., and Milner, H.V. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization* 55(4): 829-857.
- Rosendorff, B. P. 2005. Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure. *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 389-400.
- Svobik, M. 2006. Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 909-925.
- Voeten, E.. 2014. Does Participation in International Organizations Increase Cooperation? *Review of International Organizations* 9(3): 285-308.

Week 8 (1/3): International institutions: Compliance, enforcement, and effectiveness

This module builds on the previous week by extending the analysis of international institutions (e.g., treaties or IOs) to areas of compliance, enforcement, and effectiveness. We investigate these topics from a substantive and methodological perspective.

Required readings:

- Simmons, B. 2010. Treaty Compliance and Violation. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13(1): 273-296.
- Drezner, D.W. 2000. Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive? *International Organization* 54(1): 73-102.
- Dai, X. 2005. Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. *International Organization* 59(2): 363-398.
- "Beijing Rejects Tribunal's Ruling in South China Sea Case." *The Guardian*. 12 July 2016. Link: <https://goo.gl/U1O8fp>

Recommended readings:

- Bernauer, T., Kalbhenn, A., Koubi, V., and Spilker, G. 2013. Is There a “Depth versus Participation” Dilemma in International Cooperation? *Review of International Organizations* 8(4): 477-497.
- [*] Chayes, A., and A. Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. *International Organization* 47(2): 175-205.
- [*] Downs, G.W., D. M. Roche, and P. N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? *International Organization* 50(3): 379-406.
- [*] Fearon, J. D. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization* 52(2): 269-305.
- Gilligan, M. J. 2004. Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-Off in International Multilateral Agreements? *International Organization* 58(3): 459-484.
- Goldstein, J.L., D. Rivers, and M. Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67.
- Hafner-Burton, E. 2005. Trading Human Rights. How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression. *International Organization* 59(3): 593-629.
- Lupu, Y. 2013. The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4): 912-25.
- —. 2014. Why Do States Join Some Universal Treaties But Not Others? An Analysis of Treaty Commitment Preferences. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Online First.
- Mansfield, E.D., and Reinhardt, E. 2003. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements. *International Organization* 57(4): 829-862.
- Stone, R. W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 577-591.
- von Stein, J. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611-22.
- Young, O.R. 2011. Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Existing Knowledge, Cutting-edge Themes, and Research Strategies, *Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences* 108(50): 19853-19860.

Week 9 (8/3): Organised crime and conflict

This module discusses the links between clandestine political economies and internal conflict.

Required readings:

- Kalyvas, S.N. 2015. How Civil Wars Help Explain Organized Crime—and How They Do Not. Forthcoming in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Andreas, P. 2004. The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia. *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 29-51.
- Cornell, S.E., and M. Jonsson. eds. 2014. *Conflict, Crime, and the State in Postcommunist Eurasia*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Chapter 1.
- Menkhaus, K. 2016. *Non-state Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia*. Kitchener, Ontario: Centre for Security Governance.

Recommended readings:

- Andreas, P. 2013. *Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [*] Asal, V., H.B. Milward, and E.W. Schoon. 2015. When Terrorists Go Bad: Analyzing Terrorist Organizations' Involvement in Drug Smuggling. *International Studies Quarterly* 59(1): 112-123.
- Bakker, R.M., J. Raab, and H.B. Milward. 2012. A Preliminary Theory of Dark Network Resilience. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 31(1): 33-62.
- Collier, P. 2000. Rebellion as a Quasi-criminal Activity. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(6): 839-853.
- Cornell, S.E. 2007. Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30: 207-227.
- Kego, A., and A. Molcean. 2011. *Russian Speaking Organized Crime Groups in the EU*. Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy.
- [*] Koivu, K.L. 2015. In the Shadow of the State: Mafias and Illicit Markets. Forthcoming in *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Lessing, B. 2015. Logics of Violence in Criminal War. Forthcoming in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Shortland, A., and F. Varese. 2015. State Building, Informal Governance, and Organised Crime: The Case of Somali Piracy. Forthcoming in *Political Studies*.
- Skaperdas, S. 2001. The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection When the State Does Not. *Economics of Governance* 2: 173-202.
- Zohar, E. 2016. A New Typology of Contemporary Armed Non-State-Actors: Interpreting the Diversity. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39: 423-450.

Week 10 (15/3): *Domestic politics in IR and audience costs*

This module looks at the role which domestic politics play in International Relations and specifically examines the audience cost argument.

Required readings:

- Schultz, K. A. 2001. Looking for Audience Costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(1): 32-60.
- Tomz, M. 2007. Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. *International Organization* 61(4): 821-40.
- Chaudoin, S. 2014. Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions. *International Organization* 68(1): 235-265.
- Check out this website: EU Commission. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Link: <https://goo.gl/qyEej0>

Recommended readings:

- Allee, T. L., and P. K. Huth. 2006. Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover. *American Political Science Review* 100(2): 219-34.
- Baccini, L., and J. Urpelainen. 2014. Before Ratification: Understanding the Timing of International Treaty Effects on Domestic Policies. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(1): 29-43.
- Bernauer, T., A. Kalbhenn, V. Koubi, and G. Spilker. 2010. A Comparison of International and Domestic Sources of Global Governance Dynamics. *British Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 509-38.
- [*] Milner, H.V. 1997. *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- [*] Fearon, J.D. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577-92.
- Gray, J. 2009. International Organizations as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(4): 931-49.
- [*] Leeds, B.A. 1999. Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 979-1002.
- Lupu, Y. 2013. Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements. *International Organization* 67(3): 469-503.
- —. 2015. Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements. *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3): 578-594.

- Mansfield, E.D., and J.C. Pevehouse. 2006. Democratization and International Organizations. *International Organization* 60(1): 137-67.
- [*] Putnam, R. D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization* 42(3): 427-60.
- Snyder, J., and E.D. Borghard. 2011. The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound. *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 437-456.

Week 11 (22/3): Democratic institutions: Trade and the global environment

This module revisits the “democratic difference” claim that democracies consistently cooperate more than their autocratic counterparts. We ask how to rationalise this claim (if at all) and draw on examples from the IR literatures on trade and the global environment.

Required readings:

- Mansfield, E.D., H.V. Milner, and B.P. Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56(3): 477-513
- Kono, D.Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 369-84.
- Baettig, M.B., and T. Bernauer. 2009. National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy? *International Organization* 63(2): 281-308.
- Looney, R. 2016. Democracy is the Answer to Climate Change. *Foreign Policy*. Link: <https://goo.gl/9SCLvf>

Recommended readings:

- Bayer, P., and J. Urpelainen. 2016. It’s All About Political Incentives: Democracy and the Renewable Feed-In Tariff. *Journal of Politics* 78(2): 603-619.
- Bernauer, T. 2013. Climate Change Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 421-448.
- Chaudoin, S. 2014. Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes. *International Organization* 68(4): 877-911.
- Cao, X., and A. Prakash. 2012. Trade Competition and Environmental Regulations: Domestic Political Constraints and Issue Visibility. *Journal of Politics* 74(1): 66-82.
- [*] Congleton, R. D. 1992. Political Institutions and Pollution Control. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 74(3): 412-21.

- Dai, X. 2002. Political Regimes and International Trade: The Democratic Difference Revisited. *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 159-165.
- —. 2006. The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(5): 690-713.
- [*] Goldstein, J., and L.L. Martin. 2000. Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note. *International Organization* 54(3): 603-32.
- [*] Lake, D.A., and M.A. Baum. 2001. The Invisible Hand of Democracy Political Control and the Provision of Public Services. *Comparative Political Studies* 34(6): 587-621.
- Li, Q., and R. Reuveny. 2006. Democracy and Environmental Degradation. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(4): 935-56.
- [*] Mansfield, E.D., H.V. Milner, and B.P. Rosendorff. 2000. Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade. *The American Political Science Review* 94(2): 305-21.
- McLean, E.V., and R.W. Stone. 2012. The Kyoto Protocol: Two-Level Bargaining or European Leadership? *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 99-113.
- Neumayer, E. 2002. Do Democracies Exhibit Stronger International Environmental Commitment? A Cross-Country Analysis. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(2): 139-64.
- Raustiala, K. 1997. Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation: Comparative Responses to the Convention on Biological Diversity. *World Politics* 49(4): 482-509.